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Abstract
Adversarial examples that can fool deep models
are mainly crafted by adding small perturbations
imperceptible to human eyes. There are various
optimization-based methods in the literature to gen-
erate adversarial perturbations, most of which are
time-consuming. AdvGAN, a method proposed by
Xiao et al. in IJCAI 2018, employs Generative Ad-
versarial Networks (GAN) to generate adversarial
perturbation with original images as inputs, which
is faster than optimization-based methods at infer-
ence time. AdvGAN, however, fixes the target
classes in the training and we find it difficult to
train AdvGAN when it is modified to take origi-
nal images and target classes as inputs. In this pa-
per, we propose Attack-Inspired GAN (AI-GAN)
with a different training strategy to solve this prob-
lem. AI-GAN is a two-stage method, in which we
use projected gradient descent (PGD) attack to in-
spire the training of GAN in the first stage and ap-
ply standard training of GAN in the second stage.
Once trained, the Generator can approximate the
conditional distribution of adversarial instances and
generate imperceptible adversarial perturbations
given different target classes. We conduct experi-
ments and evaluate the performance of AI-GAN on
MNIST and CIFAR-10. Compared with AdvGAN,
AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates with
similar perturbation magnitudes.
1 Introduction
Deep neural networks have been intensively applied in var-
ious scenarios, including those safety and security criti-
cal ones, such as autopilots, face recognition and video
surveillance. Despite the mighty capability, recent studies
have found that they are vulnerable to adversarial exam-
ples [Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015]. The
existence of adversarial examples has greatly challenged the
reliability of deep learning models. An attack could be
launched by crafting imperceptible perturbations on legiti-
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mate samples, so that the generated adversarial examples can
easily fool deep neural networks.
Many researchers have managed to generate such per-
turbations in different ways, such as box-constrained
L-BFGS [Szegedy et al., 2014], Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) [Goodfellow et al., 2015], Jacobian-based Saliency
Map Attack (JSMA) [Papernot et al., 2016] and C&W at-
tack [Carlini and Wagner, 2017]. These attack methods are
optimization-based with proper distance metrics L0, L2 and
L∞ to restrict the magnitudes of perturbations and make the
presented adversarial examples visually natural. These meth-
ods, however, are usually time-consuming and need to access
the target models at inference period.
In order to accelerate the generation process, some re-
searchers start to employ generative models to produce adver-
sarial perturbations [Xiao et al., 2018; Poursaeed et al., 2018;
Jandial et al., 2019], or generate adversarial examples di-
rectly [Song et al., 2018; Liu and Hsieh, 2019]. AdvGAN
proposed by [Xiao et al., 2018] uses Generative Adversarial
Networks (GAN) [Goodfellow et al., 2014] to generate ad-
versarial perturbations. In AdvGAN, the generator produces
adversarial perturbations while the discriminator determines
whether generated adversarial examples are realistic. How-
ever, targeted classes are determined beforehand in AdvGAN
when performing targeted attacks, which constrains the rep-
resentation ability of GAN. [Liu and Hsieh, 2019] and [Song
et al., 2018] utilize GAN to generate adversarial examples for
different target classes from latent vector. In their methods,
GAN takes a random vector and target classes as inputs and
generates adversarial examples without corresponding exist-
ing natural images. Such methods are not applicable when
the original images are given. To attack a face recognition
system, for example, searching corresponding latent vectors
of targeted faces is unrealistic. In this paper, we argue that
generating adversarial perturbations is more practical than
searching in latent space for targeted attacks. And adversarial
examples crafted by adding perturbations can supplement ex-
isting datasets, which is potentially beneficial to adversarial
training [Madry et al., 2018].
To solve the aforementioned problems, we propose a new
variant of GAN to generate adversarial perturbations condi-
tionally and efficiently, which is named Attack-Inspired GAN
(AI-GAN). There are two stages in the training phase of
AI-GAN: in the first stage, we jointly train a generator, a
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discriminator, and an attacker. The attacker is used to inspire
the generator to produce effective perturbations quickly in the
joint training. The discriminator estimates the similarity be-
tween adversarial examples generated by the generator and
the attacker. In the second stage, we remove the attacker
and apply the standard GAN training strategy. The outputs
of the generator are fine-tuned, since the discriminator now
estimates the similarity between adversarial examples gen-
erated by the generator and original images. As for evalu-
ation of AI-GAN, we first compare the training process of
AI-GAN and the modified AdvGAN that takes original sam-
ples and target classes as inputs. Then we employ AI-GAN
to perform attacks as well as AdvGAN in various experimen-
tal settings (semi-whitebox vs. black-box, under defenses or
without defenses). From the experiments, we conclude that
1) our model architecture and training strategy are more rea-
sonable than AdvGAN for generating adversarial examples,
2) AI-GAN achieves higher attack rates than AdvGAN un-
der same L∞ bound of perturbations in various experimental
settings.
We summarize our contributions as follows:
1. Different from AdvGAN, we propose AI-GAN with a
two-stage training strategy to generate adversarial exam-
ples, which takes less epochs to train for certain success
rates (e.g. 90%) and high generation quality than Adv-
GAN.
2. Our experiments show that AI-GAN can produce per-
ceptually realistic examples and achieve high attack suc-
cess rates with different target classes on MNIST (>
97%) and CIFAR-10 (> 92%).
3. We apply AI-GAN on MNIST and CIFAR-10 with dif-
ferent target models and show that AI-GAN achieves
higher attack success rates than AdvGAN in different
experimental settings (semi-whitebox vs. black-box, un-
der defenses vs. no defenses).
2 Related Work
2.1 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples, which are able to mislead deep neural
networks, are first discovered by [Szegedy et al., 2014]. They
manage to maximize the network’s prediction error by adding
hardly perceptible perturbations to benign images. Since
then, various attack methods have been proposed. [Good-
fellow et al., 2015] developed Fast Gradient Sign Method
(FGSM) to compute the perturbations efficiently using back-
propagation. The perturbations could be expressed as η =
 sign (∇x J(θ, x, y)), where J(θ, x, y) represents the cross en-
tropy loss function, and  is a constant. Thus adversarial ex-
amples are expressed as xA = x + η. One intuitive extension
of FGSM is Basic Iterative Method [Kurakin et al., 2016]
which executes FGSM many times with smaller  . [Paper-
not et al., 2016] proposed Jacobian-based Saliency Map At-
tack (JSMA) with L0 distance. The saliency map discloses
the likelihood of fooling the target network when modify-
ing pixels in original images. Optimization-based methods
have been proposed to generate quasi-imperceptible pertur-
bations with constraints in different distance metrics. [Car-
lini and Wagner, 2017] designed a set of attack methods.
The objective function is minimizing ‖δ‖p + c · f (x + δ),
where c is an constant and p could be 0, 2 or ∞. [Chen
et al., 2017] also proposed an algorithm approximating the
gradients of targeted models based on Zeroth Order Op-
timization (ZOO). [Madry et al., 2018] introduced a con-
vex optimization method called Projected Gradient Descent
(PGD) to generate adversarial examples, which is proved to
be the strongest one-order attack. However, such methods are
usually time-consuming because the optimization process is
slow, and they are only able to generate perturbations once a
time.
2.2 Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs)
GAN is firstly proposed by [Goodfellow et al., 2014] and has
achieved great success in various tasks [Isola et al., 2017;
Zhu et al., 2017; Reed et al., 2016]. GAN consists of two
competing neural networks with different objectives, called
the discriminator D(x) and the generator G(z) respectively.
The training phase could be seen as a min-max game of the
discriminator and the generator. The generator is trained to
generate fake images to fool the discriminator while the dis-
criminator tries to classify the real images and the fake im-
ages. Usually the generator and the discriminator are trained
alternatively while the other one is fixed. The original objec-
tive function is denoted as
min
G
max
D
V(D,G) =Ex∼pdata (x)[logD(x)]
+ Ez∼pz (z)[log(1 − D(G(z)))]
(1)
However, the training of vanilla GAN is very unstable. To
stabilize the GAN training, a variety of improvements of
GAN are developed such as DCGAN [Radford et al., 2015],
WGAN [Arjovsky et al., 2017] and WGAN with gradient
penalty [Gulrajani et al., 2017]. In this paper, we use WGAN
with gradient penalty.
2.3 Generating Adversarial Examples via
Generative Models
Generative models are usually used to create new data be-
cause of their powerful representation ability. [Poursaeed et
al., 2018] firstly applied generative models to generate four
types of adversarial perturbations (universal or image depen-
dent, targeted or non-targeted) with U-Net [Ronneberger et
al., 2015] and ResNet [He et al., 2016] architectures. [Xiao et
al., 2018] used the idea of GAN to make adversarial examples
more realistic. Different from the above methods generating
adversarial perturbations, some other methods generate ad-
versarial examples directly, which are called unrestricted ad-
versarial examples [Song et al., 2018]. Song et al. [2018] pro-
posed to search the latent space of pretrained ACGAN [Odena
et al., 2017] to find adversarial examples. Rob-GAN [Liu
and Hsieh, 2019] combines adversarial training [Madry et al.,
2018] with GAN training to enhance Generator and Discrim-
inator in the presence of adversarial attacks. Generating ad-
versarial examples directly may extend datasets, but it is more
challenging and less flexible than generating perturbations in
some scenarios. Given specific target images in face recog-
nition systems, for example, it would be time-consuming to
find the corresponding latent vector if the dimension of latent
vector is large.
3 Our Approach
3.1 Problem Definition
Consider a classification network f trained on dataset X ⊆
Rn , with n being the number of features. And suppose (xi, yi)
is the ith instance in the training data, where xi ∈ X is gener-
ated from some unknown distribution Pdata, and yi ∈ Y is the
ground truth label. The classifier f is trained on natural im-
ages and achieves a high accuracy. The goal of an adversary
is to generate an adversarial example xa, which is able to let
f output a wrong prediction and looks similar to x in terms
of some distance metrics. We use L∞ to bound the magnitude
of perturbations. There are two types of such attacks: given
an instance (x, y), the adversary makes f (xa) , y, which is
called untargeted attack; or f (xa) = t given a target class
t, which is called targeted attack. Targeted attack is more
challenging than untargeted attack, and we mainly focus on
targeted attack in this paper.
3.2 Proposed Framework
We propose a new variant of GAN with two training stages
which is called Attack-Inspired GAN (AI-GAN) to generate
adversarial examples conditionally and efficiently. As shown
in Figure 1, the overall architectures of AI-GAN , consists of
a generator G, a discriminator D, an attacker A, and a target
classifier C. For comparsion, the architecture of AdvGAN
by [Xiao et al., 2018] is illustrated in Figure 2.
𝑥
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Adv
Adv
Figure 1: The architecture of our AI-GAN. We use the dashed line
and dot-dashed line to indicate the data flow for Stage 1 and Stage 2
respectively. Solid lines are used in both stages.
There are two main differences between AI-GAN and Ad-
vGAN according to their architectures. First, AdvGAN
fixes target classes in training, which constrains the generator
to produce only one-class targeted adversarial perturbations,
while AI-GAN takes the original images and target classes as
inputs, and can produce adversarial perturbations for differ-
ent target classes. Second, we find simply embedding target
classes with original images in AdvGAN is difficult to train,
as discussed later Section 4.1. Thus we propose AI-GAN, a
two-stage method, to solve this problem. We train GAN and
an attacker jointly in the first stage to generate adversarial ex-
amples quickly and fine-tune it in the second stage.
𝑥 𝑥 + 𝐺(𝑥)
Original image
Generator
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Discriminator
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Adv
Figure 2: The architecture of AdvGAN by [Xiao et al., 2018].
In AI-GAN, Generator G takes a clean image x and the
target class label t as inputs to generate adversarial perturba-
tions G(x, t). t are sampled randomly. Then an adversarial
example can be obtained with x+G(x, t) and sent to Discrim-
inator D. There are two stages when training AI-GAN. In
the first stage, D distinguishes the two types of adversarial
examples x + G(x, t) and A(x, t), which are generated by the
Generator G and the Attacker A respectively. Target classes
are the same for G and A. In the second stage, adversarial ex-
amples generated by A are substituted with original samples,
and then standard GAN training is applied. The target classi-
fier C takes x +G(x, t) as its input and outputs corresponding
logits. The logits are used to calculate a loss LC
adv
, which
indicates the effectiveness of generated adversarial examples.
The objective function of our model is expressed as
L = LCadv + λLGAN + γLhinge, (2)
where λ and γ are weights of different objectives. We explain
LCadv, LGAN, and Lhinge as follows.
LCadv is the loss of fooling target classifier C and is lever-
aged to generate adversarial examples, which is expressed as1
LCadv = Ex`C(x + G(x), t), (3)
where t is the target class and `C represents the loss function
used when training target classifier C.
LGAN is adversarial loss used in GAN’s training [Good-
fellow et al., 2014], which is used to encourage generated
samples similar to the original samples.
For the first stage, LGAN is expressed as
L1GAN = Ex logD(A(x, t)) + Ex log(1 − D(x + G(x, t))) (4)
where A(x, t) is adversarial examples crafted by the attacker
A.
For the second stage, LGAN is expressed as
L2GAN = Ex logD(x) + Ex log(1 − D(x + G(x, t))) (5)
Lhinge is called Hinge loss to bound the magnitude of the
perturbations, which is common in prior work [Carlini and
Wagner, 2017; Xiao et al., 2018].
Lhinge = Ex max (0, ‖G(x)‖2 − c) , (6)
where c denotes a user-defined constant.
1We denote Ex ≡ Ex∼Pdata for simplicity.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate AI-GAN in two ways. First,
we compare the training processes of AdvGAN and AI-GAN
from the perspectives of attack success rates and generation
qualities of adversarial examples. Second, we examine Ad-
vGAN and AI-GAN in semi-whitebox [Xiao et al., 2018]
and black-box setting on MNIST [LeCun et al., 2010] and
CIFAR-10 [Krizhevsky, 2009], respectively. In black-box
setting, we train substitute models based on Dynamic Dis-
tillation [Xiao et al., 2018], which means distilled models are
not static and jointly trained with GAN. With dynamic distil-
lation, the generator can approximate how target models re-
spond to adversarial examples. In all of our experiments, we
constrain the perturbations for different attack methods under
an L∞ bound of 0.3 on MNIST and 8 on CIFAR-10.
Implementation Details. We adopt generator and dis-
criminator architectures similar to those of [Zhu et al., 2017]
and use Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [Madry et al.,
2018] as an attacker in the training process. Note that any
optimization-based attack method in the literature can be
used theoretically. We use Wasserstein Metric and Gradient
Penalty proposed in [Gulrajani et al., 2017] to stabilize the
training of GAN. Stop epoch for the first stage and the it-
eration number of PGD are hyper-parameters, which are set
to 10 and 40 respectively. We apply C&W loss [Carlini and
Wagner, 2017] and set confidence κ = 0 in our experiments.
We use Adam as our solver [Kingma and Ba, 2014], with a
batch size of 64 and learning rate of 0.001.
Target Models in the Experiments. We select two mod-
els as target models on different datasets. For MNIST, we use
model A from [Trame`r et al., 2018] and model B from [Car-
lini and Wagner, 2017], whose architectures are shown in Ta-
ble 1. For CIFAR-10, we use ResNet-18 and ResNet-34 [He
et al., 2016]. These models are pretrained on natural data.
Models A and B achieve 99% accuracy on test data while
ResNet18 and ResNet34 achieve 93% accuracy2.
Model A Model B
Conv(32, 3, 3)+ReLU
Conv(64, 5, 5)+ReLU Conv(32, 3, 3)+ReLU
Conv(64, 5, 5)+ReLU MaxPool(2, 2)
Dropout(0.25) Conv(64, 3, 3)+ReLU
FullyConnected(128)+ReLU Conv(64, 3, 3)+ReLU
Dropout(0.5) MaxPool(2, 2)
FullyConnected + Softmax FullyConnected(200) + ReLU
FullyConnected(200) + ReLU
Softmax
Table 1: Model architectures used in this work for MNIST dataset.
4.1 Advantages of AI-GAN
As we all know, the training process of GAN in practice is
usually unstable and time-consuming. In our method, an at-
tacker is trained jointly with GAN to improve the training
2Pretrained PyTorch models can be downloaded from https://
github.com/huyvnphan/PyTorch-CIFAR10
process. We argue that our framework is non-trivial. Adv-
GAN learns only the distribution of adversarial examples for
one target class. When performing attacks with different tar-
get classes, the generator is required to learn the conditional
distribution of adversarial instances, which is more challeng-
ing. According to our experiments, it is difficult to train Adv-
GAN when simply embedding target classes and original im-
ages. In AI-GAN, we employ an attacker to perform attacks
in first stage, which can inspire the generator and shrink the
search space. We conduct the experiments of AI-GAN and
AdvGAN on MNIST in semi-whitebox settings. Models A
and B under no defenses are used as target models.
First, we test these two methods and visualize attack suc-
cess rates during training in Figure 3. Note that we modify
AdvGAN in this section so that it takes original images and
target classes as inputs. As shown in Figure 3, we evaluate the
attack success rates of two methods for 200 training epochs.
We can see that AI-GAN needs less epochs than AdvGAN to
satisfy a certain attack success rate (e.g. 90%). The attacker
gives a correct direction to the generator to search for adver-
sarial examples, which makes the generator produce adver-
sarial examples quickly. As for training time, AI-GAN takes
much time in the first stage due to PGD attack. In our exper-
iments, AI-GAN takes 300s and 37s per epoch on average in
two stages while AdvGAN takes 35s per epoch on average.
But more important, the first stage of AI-GAN plays a key
role in increasing attack success rates as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Attack success rates of training AdvGAN and AI-GAN
on MNIST for 200 epochs under L∞ bound of 0.3. Apparently
AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates than AdvGAN within
same epochs. We use method-target model to identify corresponding
lines.
Second, as shown in Figure 4, we sample some original
images and adversarial examples to compare the generation
quality of two methods. These samples are generated on
MNIST after training 10 epochs (Stage 1) and 100 epochs
(Stage 2), which are shown in second and third column in
Figure 4. In Stage 1, it is hard to tell samples generated by
which method are better in quality. But in Stage 2, pertur-
bations generated by AI-GAN are visually smaller than that
in Stage 1, while there is little progress of AdvGAN. Corre-
spondingly, adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN are
more realistic than that generated by AdvGAN after training
100 epochs.
In summary, Figure 3 and Figure 4 appeals that AI-GAN
can produce adversarial examples with higher success rates
and qualities than AdvGAN within same training epochs. The
two-stage training and inspiration of the attacks applied in
AI-GAN contribute to generate realistic adversarial examples
quickly, which makes AI-GAN outperform AdvGAN.
Original Images Stage 1 (Epoch 10) Stage 2 (Epoch 100)
Figure 4: Original images and adversarial examples sampled in two
stages from left to right. The first row is generated by AI-GAN and
the second row is generated by AdvGAN. Original images are shown
on the diagonal and the numbers on the left denote target classes for
each row.
4.2 Attack in Semi-Whitebox Setting
We conduct attacks to classifiers with different architectures
for MNIST and CIFAR-10 under different conditions: under
defenses or no defenses.
Attack without defenses
We apply AI-GAN to perform semi-whitebox attack against
different models on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The performance
of AI-GAN is shown in Table 2. From the table we can see
that AI-GAN achieves high attack success rates with different
target classes. For MNIST, the average attack success rates
are 99.38% and 99.71% for model A and B. And the suc-
cess rates are no less than 97% in all classes. For CIFAR-10,
the average attack success rates are 96.07% and 96.86% for
ResNet18 and ResNet34. The attack success rates for all
classes are above 90%. Compared to AdvGAN, average at-
tack success rates of AI-GAN are higher when against most
models both on MNIST and CIFAR-10 as shown in Table 3.
Note that once AI-GAN is trained, it could generate adver-
sarial examples under different conditions, while we need to
train 10 AdvGANs to attack with 10 different target classes.
Randomly selected adversarial examples generated are
shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. We make a comparison be-
tween adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN and Adv-
GAN on MNIST in Figure 5. In some characters like 0 and
8, AI-GAN is better than AdvGAN apparently. And Figure 6
shows adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN with dif-
ferent target models on CIFAR-10.
Attack Under defenses
There are various defenses proposed against adver-
sarial examples in the literature [Madry et al., 2018;
Figure 5: Adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN (Row 1) and
AdvGAN (Row 2) for different models on MNIST with different
target classes (same as Figure 3). From left to right, target models
are model A and B for each column. Original images are shown on
the diagonal.
Samangouei et al., 2018], and adversarial training [Madry
et al., 2018] is widely accepted as the most effective
way. For evaluation of adversarial examples generated
by AI-GAN, we select three adversarial training methods
to improve robustness of target models. The first adver-
sarial training method is proposed by [Goodfellow et al.,
2015] based on FGSM. The objective function is expressed as
J˜(θ, x, y) = αJ(θ, x, y) + (1 − α)J (θ, x +  sign (∇x J(θ, x, y)) .
The second method is Ensemble Adversarial Training ex-
tended from the first method by [Trame`r et al., 2018], and
we use two different models as static models to generate
adversarial examples on each dataset. And the third method
is proposed by [Madry et al., 2018], which employs PGD as
a universal first-order adversary.
We evaluate the performance of AI-GAN and AdvGAN
quantitatively under these defense methods. As shown in
Table 4, AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rate than
AdvGAN when target models are trained with defenses.
4.3 Attack in Black-box Setting
In this section, we use AI-GAN to perform attacks in black-
box setting. We assume the adversary is not aware of the
defense strategies but could get the outputs of target models.
Since the black-box attack is based on dynamic distillation
strategy, a distilled model fd is constructed in our experi-
ments. And when applying dynamic distillation during train-
ing, local model fd is updated every time after updating the
generator. The advantage of dynamic distillation is the gen-
erator can approximate the predictions of target models when
(a) ResNet18 (b) ResNet34
Figure 6: Adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN for different
models on CIFAR-10 with different targets. Original images are
shown on the diagonal.
MNIST(%) CIFAR-10(%)
Target Class Model A Model B ResNet18 ResNet34
Class 1 98.89 99.09 97.39 98.01
Class 2 99.54 99.25 95.92 98.40
Class 3 99.50 99.89 96.52 90.32
Class 4 99.90 99.84 92.96 96.32
Class 5 99.67 99.96 93.04 95.28
Class 6 99.94 99.74 98.73 99.31
Class 7 99.84 99.83 98.66 97.17
Class 8 99.94 99.83 97.21 96.59
Class 9 97.52 99.88 96.97 99.54
Class 10 99.10 99.74 93.30 97.69
Average 98.67 99.18 95.65 97.68
Table 2: Attack success rates of adversarial examples generated
by AI-GAN against different different models on MNIST and
CIFAR-10 in semi-whitebox setting.
fed with adversarial examples and learn to generate more ag-
gressive adversarial examples. According to the experiments
in [Xiao et al., 2018], dynamic distillation helps AdvGAN to
achieve attack success rates(e.g. 93.4%) in black-box setting
as high as in semi-whitebox setting, when there is no defense
of target models. Here we only consider the situation where
the defenses of target models are applied in black-box setting,
which is more challenging.
We select LeNet-5 [LeCun et al., 1998] and a shallow
ResNet as the local model architectures for MNIST and
CIFAR-10 respectively, while Model B and ResNet34 are tar-
get models under three different defenses. Other experimen-
tal settings are same as that in semi-whitebox setting.
MNIST(%) CIFAR-10(%)
Methods Model A Model B ResNet18 ResNet34
AdvGAN 98.67 99.18 95.65 97.68
AI-GAN 99.38 99.71 96.07 96.86
Table 3: Comparison of attack success rate of adversarial examples
generated by AI-GAN and AdvGAN in semi-whitebox setting.
Dataset Model defenses AdvGAN AI-GAN
MNIST
A
Adv. 9.0% 42.6%
Ens. 10.2% 45.5%
Iter.Adv 17.7% 40.0%
B
Adv. 13.4% 45.7%
Ens. 12.1% 33.4%
Iter.Adv 10.7% 24.5%
CIFAR10
ResNet18
Adv. 14.6% 37.1%
Ens. 29.3% 44.8%
Iter.Adv 17.6% 17.7%
ResNet34
Adv. 15.6% 45.5%
Ens. 24.6% 38.8%
Iter.Adv 15.0% 20.5%
Table 4: Comparison of attack success rate of adversarial examples
generated by AI-GAN and AdvGAN in semi-whitebox setting with
defenses
We apply AI-GAN and AdvGAN to generate adversarial
examples on MNIST and CIFAR-10. The attack success
rates for different defense strategies are shown in Table 5.
On MNIST, AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates
than AdvGAN does under all three defense strategies. This
means adversarial examples generated by AI-GAN have a
great transferability. On CIFAR-10, AI-GAN also shows
stronger attack abilities in most cases.
Defense MNIST CIFAR-10AdvGAN AI-GAN AdvGAN AI-GAN
Adv. 15.1% 18.2% 14.4% 15.2%
Ens. 17.3% 24.7% 15.3% 18.2%
Iter.Adv 11.4% 32.9% 25.1% 22.2%
Table 5: Comparison of attack success rate of adversarial examples
generated by AI-GAN and AdvGAN in black-box setting.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose AI-GAN to generate adversarial ex-
amples where GAN is jointly trained with an attacker. There
are two stages in our AI-GAN framework: in the first stage,
the attacker plays as a guide of the generator and inspires the
training of generator; in the second stage, the attacker is re-
moved and the generator is encouraged to generate adversar-
ial examples similar to original samples. Once our AI-GAN
is trained, the generator can produce imperceptible pertur-
bations given different samples and target classes, and pre-
serve high attack success rates as well. Similarly to Adv-
GAN, AI-GAN can perform attacks in both semi-whitebox
and black-box settings without knowledge of defenses in
place. And AI-GAN achieves higher attack success rates than
AdvGAN under same bound of perturbations.
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